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Recent research documents that ownership concentration is higher in countries with weak investor
protection.  However, drawing on panel data on corporate ownership in 34 countries between 1995
and 2006, we show this pattern does not hold for newly public firms, which tend to have concentrated
ownership regardless of the level of investor protection. We show that firms in countries with strong
investor protection are more likely to experience decreases in ownership concentration after listing,
that these decreases appear in response to growth opportunities, and that they are associated with new
share issuance. We consider the implications of these findings for financing choices and patterns in
firm growth and analyze alternative explanations for the diffusion of ownership that could distort our
interpretations. We conclude that ownership concentration falls as firms age following their IPO in
countries with strong investor protection because firms in these countries raise capital and grow, diluting













Recent research shows that corporate ownership is less concentrated in countries where 
minority shareholders are better protected against expropriation.  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer (1999), Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008), and Dyck and 
Zingales (2004) find higher incidence of concentrated ownership among large firms in countries 
where the private benefits of control are high.  Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) and Faccio 
and Lang (2002) document similar patterns across firms in Asia and Europe.   
We show that the ownership concentration of newly public firms does not vary with 
investor protection.  Immediately following the initial public offering, ownership tends to be 
fairly concentrated in both countries that do, and countries that do not, provide strong protection 
to minority shareholders.  Measures of investor protection are strongly associated with more 
dispersed ownership only in samples of mature public firms or in broad cross-sections of young 
and old firms. 
Why does investor protection matter so much in the full cross-section, and so little for 
newly public firms?  Mechanically, it must be due to differences in the experiences of these 
firms following IPO. After first listing on the stock market, firms in countries with better 
institutions become widely held at a faster rate. This is apparent in the contrast between the 
typical newly listed firm in the US and its counterpart in Brazil. In both countries, block 
ownership of the median firm is about 50 percent soon after listing. However, in the US, block 
ownership of the median firm drops to 21 percent within five years, while in Brazil it stays 
approximately constant. 
We assemble new panel data on corporate ownership covering a large panel of firms in 
34 countries between 1995 and 2006, including 2,700 firms that go public during this period. 
Relative to previous studies, the advantage of our data is that we observe blockholdings as well 2 
 
as shares outstanding over the early lifespan of these firms as public entities, rather than at a 
single point in time.  This makes it possible to track two conceptually distinct mechanisms 
underlying ownership dynamics: blockholder sales and issuance of follow-on external equity.  
In examining the impact of investor protection, our approach builds on the approach 
taken by Helwege, Pirinsky and Stulz (2007), henceforth HPS, who explore differences in the 
evolution of ownership among US listed firms.  HPS (2007) find that stock market liquidity has 
significant effects on the diffusion of ownership – liquid stocks with high past returns tend to 
become widely held more quickly.  However, they do not find evidence that agency problems 
influence the diffusion of ownership in the US But, as they point out, there is limited variation in 
such agency problems across firms in their sample. Moreover, as shown by Doidge, Karolyi and 
Stulz (2007), country characteristics explain more of the variation in firm corporate governance 
than firm-specific characteristics. Our cross-country panel data therefore offer a suitable setting 
to study the effects of agency costs on the diffusion of corporate ownership.  
We consider two main hypotheses concerning how investor protection affects the 
evolution of ownership. First, strong investor protection increases the price at which firms can 
sell shares by reducing the private benefits of control.  In Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
controlling shareholders are reluctant to sell shares because they can only sell them at a price that 
reflects the resources they are expected to divert. Zingales (1995) and Bebchuck (1999) build on 
the idea that insiders bear agency costs and explain that controlling shareholders have an 
incentive to hold onto their shares to protect their private benefits from being expropriated in a 
takeover or by the actions of a corporate raider.  If strong investor protection reduces the extent 
to which insiders can enjoy private benefits, such protection makes it relatively more attractive 
for insiders to issue new shares or to sell existing shares to outsiders. While the mechanisms in 3 
 
these papers differ, one overall conclusion is that investor protection, by reducing the scope for 
expropriation of minority investors, increases insiders’ willingness to sell equity. Thus these 
theories predict a positive association between investor protection and the speed at which firms 
become widely held. 
Refinement of the ideas described above has implications for the interaction of investor 
protection with growth opportunities.  Blockholders trade off the costs of losing control with the 
potential benefits of new capital.  When the benefits of new capital are high – such as when firms 
face growth opportunities – the benefits of shareholder protection are greater. For firms facing 
better growth opportunities, the trade off is more likely to favor issuing shares (and thereby 
diluting ownership) in environments where investor protection limits the scope of agency 
problems.  Put into practice, strong investor protection should interact with growth opportunities 
to predict diffusion of ownership. And, to the extent that decreases in ownership are driven by 
the desire to invest, they should primarily be a consequence of share issuance rather than 
blockholder sales.   
While the predictions above concern the dynamics of corporate ownership, they have 
natural implications for firms’ overall use of leverage and patterns in growth.  Faced with growth 
opportunities, firms in countries with poor protection of minority shareholders may have to rely 
more heavily on debt to finance growth.  Despite substituting toward debt, the findings reviewed 
in Levine (2005) suggest that firms in countries with weak investor protection are still likely to 
be constrained in their ability to raise capital.
1  Put differently, in weak investor protection 
regimes, we expect firms to substitute towards debt financing, but finance less growth overall.  
                                                      
1 See, for example, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005), Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000), Claessens and 
Laeven (2003), Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), 
Levine (1999), Rajan and Zingales (1998), and Stulz and Williamson (2003).  4 
 
We find considerable support for the predictions put forth above.  Firms in countries with 
good investor protection become widely held faster, even though ownership is concentrated for a 
few years around the IPO.  Both new share issues and blockholder sales are more common in 
countries where protection is strong and private benefits of control are small.  Investor protection 
has a particularly pronounced effect on the diffusion of ownership for firms with attractive 
growth opportunities.  Such firms appear to be more willing to issue new shares, thereby diluting 
ownership.  We also find that firms in countries with weak legal protection of shareholders rely 
more heavily on debt as a source of capital when they face growth opportunities. However, 
firms’ ability to substitute away from equity to debt appears incomplete. Consistent with other 
research on finance and growth, we find that firms in countries with weaker investor protection 
increase investment by smaller amounts than firms in countries with stronger investor protection 
in response to growth opportunities.  To sum up, the results collectively imply that one of the key 
reasons that ownership concentration falls as firms age is that when investor protection is strong, 
firms can raise capital and grow.
2  
We consider four alternative hypotheses concerning the diffusion of corporate ownership, 
each of which could potentially distort the conclusions described above.  One alternative 
explanation is that changes in corporate ownership reflect blockholders’ and managers’ explicit 
attempts to time the market. Two thirds of the CFOs surveyed in Graham and Harvey (2001) 
identify the extent to which equity is “overvalued or undervalued” as an important consideration 
in the decision to issue external equity. Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) and Kim and 
Weisbach (forthcoming) find that firms use only a fraction of the funds they raise for investment, 
suggesting that market timing plays a role in new issues. In our data, there is some weak 
                                                      
2 Kim (2008) builds on this idea and shows that in countries with strong investor protection, M&A driven growth is 
more likely to be equity-based as opposed to cash-based. 5 
 
evidence that market timing has a direct effect on ownership diffusion. The more salient 
question, however, is whether market timing conditions were more attractive in countries with 
strong investor protection, as this type of omitted variable bias would influence our conclusions 
regarding the effects of investor protection. We do not find any evidence that firms’ 
responsiveness to past returns or to anticipated future returns is related to investor protection. 
A second alternative is that measures of investor protection capture effects of stock 
market liquidity, that is, the ability of blockholders to find a buyer for their shares.  Liquidity 
would have an effect on ownership concentration if insiders would like to sell shares but are 
reluctant to do so because such sales would put significant pressure on the stock price.
3  Bhide 
(1993) suggests that stock market liquidity is one reason why the US has so many widely held 
firms; Maug (1998) shows that large shareholders should hold smaller stakes when the market is 
more liquid.  HPS (2007) emphasize the role of stock market liquidity in explaining the diffusion 
of ownership of US firms: stocks with high turnover, for example, tend to become widely held at 
a faster rate.  Griffin, Nardari, and Stulz (2007) show that investors trade more following periods 
of high returns, so liquidity considerations also predict decreases in ownership concentration 
following high returns.  Consistent with this previous work, we find that proxies for stock market 
liquidity affect ownership diffusion, but again, these effects appear to be independent of investor 
protection. 
Third, our estimates of the impact of investor protection on ownership diffusion might 
reflect differences in the types of firms that go public in different environments.  Pagano, 
Panetta, and Zingales (1998) present evidence that Italian firms are larger and older than US 
                                                      
3 Bolton and Von Thadden (1998) point out that liquidity could also facilitate dispersion for reasons related to 
corporate governance.  Greater liquidity could make it easier for takeovers to occur, thus increasing the role of the 
market for corporate control in ensuring that firms are well run and reducing the need for concentrated owners to 
exert control. 6 
 
firms at the time of their IPO.  This could imply that firms in countries with weak investor 
protection require less capital following their IPO, thus reducing the extent to which 
blockholders are diluted by secondary share issuance. In our data, at the time they go public 
firms in countries with weak investor protection are larger, more profitable and less R&D 
intensive than firms in countries with strong investor protection.  Our regression analyses 
condition on these characteristics, as well as measures of growth opportunities directly. These 
controls partially address concerns about differences in firm characteristics.  Although firms that 
go public differ in interesting ways across investor protection regimes, these differences do not 
seem to distort the evidence on the two main hypotheses we test. 
A last alternative explanation is that growth opportunities differed across countries during 
our sample period in a way that is correlated with investor protection.  While we measure and 
control for growth opportunities directly, measurement error could be correlated with country 
characteristics. Consider the case in which growth opportunities were relatively better than they 
appear in countries with strong investor protection. In this case, firms in these countries might 
have stronger incentives to issue equity and become widely held.  However, only a small part of 
the variation in growth opportunities across firms is attributable to cross country differences, and 
additional tests suggest mismeasurement of growth opportunities not to be an important issue.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section describes our data 
in more detail. Section II presents our main country- and firm-level results.  It also contains 
subsections that consider further implications of our findings and that discuss alternative 
mechanisms that could explain the diffusion of corporate ownership.  The last section concludes. 
 
I.  Data 7 
 
A.  Investable weight factors 
We rely on a database of “investable weight factors” that is assembled by Standard and 
Poors.  These data have been collected with the goal of adjusting weights of stocks in their global 
index products. Most of the major global stock indexes (e.g., S&P, MSCI, Topix, and FTSE) 
employ some degree of float weighting in index construction.  
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where BH denotes the number of shares held by blockholder j of firm i and N denotes total shares 












The underlying blockholder (BH) data are culled from a variety of national sources. Our data 
account for blocks owned by three types of entities which hold their shares in part because of the 
benefits of control.  These include (1) publicly traded corporations, venture capital firms, private 
equity firms, and leveraged buy-out groups; (2) government entities; and (3) current or former 
officers and directors of the company, founders of the company, pension funds, and employee 
stock ownership plans that are associated with and controlled by the company. Within each 
group of blockholders, holdings are only considered when they cumulate to over ten percent of 
shares outstanding. However, individual holdings below five percent of shares outstanding are 
ignored, except where they belong to clearly related shareholders like family members or board 
members. The intent of this somewhat arbitrary rule is to attempt to normalize the measure 
across countries, which have different reporting standards.   8 
 
The holdings of mutual funds, insurance companies, and independent foundations are not 
considered to be a part of blockholdings even if such holdings are large because these owners are 
not believed to be interested in exerting control.  These types of investors are assumed to hold 
shares solely for purposes of collecting investment returns.  While government holdings are in 
principle part of blockholdings, they tend to be small for the vast majority of firms in our sample. 
While it is potentially interesting to disaggregate these data to understand the dynamics of 
ownership among different types of blockholders, our data do not allow it.  
Ownership data are at the security level rather than the firm level.  As a consequence, we 
may not accurately measure the extent to which specific owners control firms that have multiple 
share classes. As a robustness check, we exclude firms for which Datastream reports the 
existence of more than one share class that is traded in public markets.  
Because we are not interested in changes in reported ownership concentration that are 
related to changes in ownership restrictions, we exclude industries in which these restrictions are 
prevalent, including airlines, banks, and utilities. This is similar to the practice adopted in HPS 
(2007), who exclude banks and utilities.
4 
Finally, similar to other studies on ownership concentration, our data do not allow us to 
track ownership of firms after they are acquired. For example, it may be that some firms become 
widely held by being acquired by other firms that have dispersed ownership. Notwithstanding 
this, we can track ownership when a firm issues equity in an acquisition but continues to survive. 
This appears in our data as an increase in total shares outstanding, and it is a common form of 
ownership dilution.  Kim (2008) analyzes the use of stock- and cash-based mergers across 
                                                      
4 Some countries impose industry-specific ownership restrictions. Most of these restrictions limit foreign holdings. 
In the US, for example, foreigners’ ownership of airlines is limited to 20 percent. As mentioned above, we exclude 
airlines, banks, and utilities, among which these restrictions are most prevalent. To address concerns about other 
instances of ownership restrictions, we have identified firms for which block ownership does not change during the 
sample period and remains fixed between 50 and 90 percent. These are rare in our data. We have checked that our 
baseline firm-level regressions in Table V produce the same results when these firms are removed. 9 
 
countries, and he finds that stock-based mergers are more common where investor protection is 
stronger. 
When studying corporate ownership, data integrity is of primary importance. As pointed 
out by Holderness (forthcoming), conclusions may be sensitive to the sample of firms and to the 
quality of the underlying data. We have checked the accuracy of our ownership data against 
other sources.  We have matched our data with hand collected data used in Claessens, Djankov, 
and Lang (2000), Faccio and Lang (2002), Lins (2003), Dlugosz, Fahlenbrach, Gompers, and 
Metrick (2006), and Holderness (forthcoming).  Each of these papers assembles data from a 
variety of national databases to study the cross-section of ownership in specific countries or 
regions.  With the exception of Dlugosz, Fahlenbrach, Gompers, and Metrick (2006), these 
datasets measure ownership in a single year, so it is not possible to conduct our tests using them.  
Nevertheless, these data and our data appear to be similar along measurable dimensions.  For 
firms that appear in our data and the alternative data, the mean blockholder share of ownership 
is, respectively, 24.9% and 26.6%. Where the two measures overlap, they are 52 percent 
correlated. We also merge our ownership data with ownership data drawn from Worldscope.  
Measures of blockownership from these two sources also have similar means and a correlation of 
0.74.   
Despite these checks, we might still expect data limitations to induce measurement error 
at the firm level.  To reduce the potential impact of data errors, we point out that we are 
interested in changes in ownership concentration.   Level differences in the quality of firm-level 
data should not affect our inferences, and we see no reason that measurement error should be 
correlated with any of our explanatory variables. Nevertheless, we apply a cautious empirical 
approach in that we focus on large changes in blockholding.  10 
 
 
B.  Dynamics of Corporate Ownership: Some Examples 
To provide some intuition for the process by which firms become widely held, we briefly 
consider some examples that make evident that the percentage of shares outstanding held by 
blockholders can change for two reasons: either blockholders buy or sell, or the firm issues or 
repurchases outside equity.   
 Our first example, Nihon Eslead, a condominium developer in Japan, is a firm for which 
the blockholding share decreases following the IPO primarily because of sales from the largest 
blockholder. The firm initially went public in October 1999, but our coverage begins in 
December 2000. Panel A of Figure 1 shows the dynamics of the blockholding share for this firm. 
The thick lighter line shows the number of shares outstanding each year scaled by shares 
outstanding at the end of December 2000. The thin darker line shows total blockholdings in a 
particular year scaled by December 2000 shares outstanding. The dashed line (measured on the 
right axis) shows blockholdings in a particular year expressed as a percentage of shares 
outstanding in that year. In 2000, the majority of shares were owned by founder Sugio Aramaki. 
Shares outstanding remain approximately level between 2000 and 2006. Over this period 
Aramaki and another blockholder sold many of their shares so that blockholdings, expressed as a 
percentage of shares outstanding, fell from 91% to 48%. Data from the Japan Securities 
Handbook confirm these trends.  
Our second example, Carrier Access, traded on NASDAQ, is a firm for which the largest 
increase in float occurs primarily because of a share issuance. The company first went public in 
July of 1998, and co-founding spouses Roger Koenig and Nancy Pierce together maintained 
ownership of approximately half of the company’s shares. Between 2003 and 2004, the fraction 11 
 
of shares held by blockholders fell from 0.56 to 0.40 because of the issuance of shares in a 
secondary offering. As shown in Panel B of the figure, this event is the largest change in float 
during the sample period.  
The third panel shows our last example: Increases in float for the German firm Infineon 
Technologies occur jointly through the issuance of equity due to stock based mergers and 
acquisition and blockholder sales. 
 
C.  Other data  
In much of the analysis, we limit the sample to firms that can be identified on 
Worldscope and Datastream, which are also the source of many of the controls in our firm-level 
regressions.  In the tests that follow, we draw data from the full matched database, as well as the 
subset in which we can track ownership of the firm immediately after IPO.  We use the 
Datastream “base date” to identify firm’s first listing date.
5  We include new listings for which 
we have ownership data within 18 months of the listing date.  We also require that each country 
have at least one firm in each country that can be tracked soon after its IPO and that this firm 
have at least 5 consecutive years of data.  This is to ensure that we have a representative sample 
in each country.  The IPO sample (our primary sample) includes 14,087 firm-years, comprising 
2,700 unique firms.  Table I gives a breakdown of our data by year. Our data cover 34 countries: 
23 of these countries are covered from 1995 onwards and the remaining 11 countries from 1998 
onwards. With the exception of Argentina, which has only one firm that we can track from IPO, 
                                                      
5 We have checked our sample of IPOs against a sample of IPOs identified in SDC and CRSP, and approximately 
82% of our IPOs appear in these other samples. Results obtained using this more limited sample are not materially 
different from those presented in the paper. 12 
 
every other country has at least 6 firms in the IPO sample, and at least 20 firms in the full 
database.
6 
Worldscope and Datastream provide data used to compute two measures of Tobin’s Q.  
The first of these is firm-specific—the ratio of the sum of the market value of equity and the 
book value of debt to the book value of assets for each firm in each year.  While this measure 
should reflect opportunities faced by individual firms, it may also reflect a firm’s ability to 
pursue those opportunities. For example, suppose that investment opportunities in the steel 
industry are high, reflected in steel firms’ generally high Q. However, if a firm in that industry is 
unable to exploit those opportunities, its realizable investment opportunities will be low, as will 
be its Q. Since ideally we would have a measure of Q that is a pure proxy for the investment 
opportunities faced by the firm, we also compute average Tobin’s Q across all firms in an 
industry-year. Unlike firm-specific Q, this measure is not contaminated by firms’ ability to 
pursue growth opportunities.  
Additional controls include: the log of assets, the ratio of net property plant and 
equipment (net PPE) to assets, the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation 
(EBITDA) to sales, the level of research and development (R&D) expenditures, the ratio of debt 
to assets. We gather market capitalization from the Standard and Poors data and combine it with 
split- adjusted stock price data from Datastream to calculate shares outstanding.  For US firms, 
we take shares outstanding directly from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP).    
  Our analysis also employs several measures of country characteristics, including two 
measures of investor protection.  The first of these is the Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
and Shleifer (2008) anti-self-dealing index, which is a composite index of the degree to which a 
                                                      
6 In the original data, there is information on firms in 53 countries. For many of these countries, such as Indonesia, 
while we have information on blockholdings for a number of firm-years, there are no firms that we can track post-
IPO. Thus, the final sample of 34 countries is based on data availability. 13 
 
country’s laws protect minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders. This 
measure is theoretically grounded, predicts a variety of stock market outcomes, and addresses 
concerns that have been raised about the antidirector rights index developed in La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998).
7  The second variable is a price-based measure of the 
private benefits of control. Building on a methodology used by Barclay and Holderness (1989), 
Dyck and Zingales (2004) measure the average premium that acquirers pay for controlling a 
block of shares.  Last, several of our regression specifications include country measures of 
market liquidity:  Stock market turnover is defined as market-level shares traded scaled by shares 
outstanding.
8   
Panel A of Table II summarizes the country-level data and Panel B summarizes the data 
used in the firm-level analysis for the IPO sample. All firm-level scaled variables are winsorized 
at the 1% and 99% level.  
 
II.   Results 
  We start by presenting evidence that investor protection operates dynamically by 
conducting country-level analysis that builds on previous work. We then describe tests of the two 
main hypotheses relating ownership diffusion to agency costs between minority and majority 
shareholders and tests of some implications of these hypotheses.  The final subsection discusses 
four alternative hypotheses that could potentially distort our conclusions. 
 
A.    Country-level analysis of the dynamic effects of investor protection 
                                                      
7 A previous version of this paper replicates most of our results using the earlier Antidirector measure.  
8 Stock market turnover data are taken from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006). 14 
 
We start by testing for a relation between ownership concentration and investor 
protection at the country level. Existing cross-country studies indicate that ownership 
concentration is higher in countries with weaker investor protection, but these studies focus 
primarily on samples of mature firms.  
As a benchmark for our subsequent analysis, and to see if these previous results hold in 
our data, we isolate a sample of firms that have been public for at least 5 years in 2005 and run 
country level regressions that analyze differences in ownership concentration. These regressions 
are similar in spirit to those presented in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), Dyck 
and Zingales (2004), and other papers.  
Panel A of Table III shows the results.  The dependent variable is the median 
blockholding share in each country (the idea is to capture the ownership concentration of the 
typical firm).  The independent variables are: a Low Legal Protection dummy, Stock Market 
Turnover, and the Log of GDP per Capita.  The Low Legal Protection dummy is equal to one if 
the anti-self-dealing index takes a value less than the median value for the countries in our 
sample.  Stock Market Turnover proxies for market liquidity, and the Log of GDP per Capita 
controls for general differences in country development. 
The Low Legal Protection dummy in the third column attracts a coefficient of 0.109, 
implying that the ownership concentration of firms that have been publicly listed for at least five 
years is approximately 11% higher in countries with weak investor protection as opposed to 
strong investor protection.  Stock Market Turnover attracts a coefficient of -0.082, suggesting an 
independent effect of market liquidity on ownership concentration.  This finding is consistent 
with the results of the firm-level specifications in HPS (2007).  15 
 
Panel B shows similar tests conducted on a sample of firms that have only recently gone 
public.  We rearrange our data into IPO time, and select the first post-IPO year observation for 
each firm, as long as it is within one year of the firm’s IPO.  The dependent variable is the 
median blockholding share for firms in this sample by country.  In column 3, the coefficient on 
the Low Legal Protection dummy is not significant, and it is more than 40% smaller than the 
corresponding coefficient in Panel A.  In short, there does not appear to be a relation between 
investor protection and ownership concentration for newly public firms.   
To shed light on the contrast between Panel A and Panel B of Table III, Figure 2 plots 
blockholding shares in IPO time for firms in countries with low and high investor protection.
9  
The distinction between low and high investor protection is again based on the sample median 
value of the anti-self-dealing index.   
Around the time of the IPO, the median blockholding share is similar (and high) in both 
high and low investor protection countries.  Ownership diffuses following IPO in countries with 
strong investor protection - so that the median blockholding share falls from 60% to below 25% 
after 5 years.  In countries with weak investor protection, however, the median blockholding 
share remains above 45% five years after firms are public.  The figure suggests that previous 
results on the cross-section of ownership are in large part driven by differences in the evolution 
of ownership over time. 
Taken together, the results indicate that investor protection has an effect that accumulates 
through time for firms that have recently gone public. We can estimate this effect more formally 
by running OLS regressions of the change in blockholdings on a set of country characteristics: 
                                                      
9 Figure 2 is created using a dataset formed by merging the S&P data with Datastream, which allows us to indentify 
IPOs.  This dataset includes information on 3025 IPOs; this is slightly more than the primary sample we analyze 
below because there is no requirement that firms appear in Worldscope. 
 16 
 
  1 () kt kt k k k kt BHS a bBHS cP dTurnover eLog GDP ε − −Δ = + + + + +  (3) 
where k indexes the country and t indexes the year, and P measures investor protection. The 
dependent variable is a measure of decreases in the median ownership share held by 
blockholders for firms in the IPO sample.  It is the difference between the country median block 
ownership between two consecutive years and therefore captures the typical change in ownership 
concentration for newly public firms.  Larger values of this dependent variable imply larger 
decreases in block holding, and negative values are increases in blockholding.  This approach 
facilitates comparison with the firm level analysis that follows.  We control for lagged 
blockholding because large decreases are more common for firms with larger initial levels of 
blockholding.  T-statistics are based on standard errors that are clustered at the country level. 
The tests are presented in Table IV and use the same independent variables as before.  
Although the coefficient on the Low Legal Protection dummy is only marginally significant in 
the first column, it is significant in the third.  The Low Investor Protection dummy attracts a 
coefficient of -0.026, implying that decreases in median blockholding shares are 2.6 percentage 
points larger in countries with stronger investor protection.  The magnitude of this effect is 
considerably larger than the one percentage point mean decrease in block holding share observed 
in the data.   
   
B.  Firm-level analysis of the two main hypotheses 
An agency based theory of corporate ownership stresses the tradeoff between the costs of 
losing control and the benefits of obtaining new capital.  A good test of the theory would identify 
both the costs and the benefits, and thus requires firm-level data. Specifically, firm-level data 
help isolate the benefits of new capital by measuring firm-level growth opportunities.   17 
 
To review, our predictions are as follows. If strong investor protection reduces the cost of 
losing control, then firms in countries with high protection would be more likely to decrease 
ownership concentration.  The impact of investor protection should interact with growth 
opportunities.  Investor protection should have larger effects for firms with attractive growth 
opportunities. These firms have stronger incentives to issue equity, thereby diluting ownership.   
We first present some aggregate statistics on the incidence of decreases in the 
blockholding share across types of countries for firms with different growth opportunities.  These 
are shown in Panel A of Figure 3.  In the figure, the bars represent the share of firm-years for 
which there is a greater than five percent decrease in ownership concentration.  The left bars 
show this share for firms in countries with weak investor protection, and the right bars show this 
share for firms in countries with strong investor protection.  Within each pair, the shaded bar 
shows the share for firms with an above sample median beginning-of-period Tobin’s Q, and the 
clear bar shows the share for firms with below sample median beginning-of-period Tobin’s Q.  
Decreases in the blockholding share occur more often in countries with strong investor 
protection.  Decreases in blockholding shares among firms with poor growth opportunities are 
similar across countries with low and high investor protection, but decreases are particularly 
prevalent among firms with strong growth opportunities in countries with high investor 
protection.  More than 40% of observations in this category are associated with decreases in 
blockholding shares in excess of 5%. 
To analyze these decreases more formally, our main specification modifies the baseline 
regression in HPS (2007).  As in HPS (2007), the dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 
one when the blockholding share decreases by at least 5%.  This approach keeps the focus on 
large changes in ownership structure, rather than, for example, small changes that arise when 18 
 
managers exercise stock options.  It is also appropriate given that hypotheses about the effects of 
growth opportunities on incentives to raise capital and dilute blockholders primarily have 
implications for decreases, rather than increases, in ownership concentration.  We estimate probit 
regressions forecasting changes in the blockholding share:  
  11 1 Pr(( 0.05) 1) ijkt ijkt ijkt k ijkt k t ijkt BHS a bBHS cQ dP eQ P Z F ε −− − Δ< − = = + ++ +× + +  (4) 
where i,j,k,t denote firm, industry, country, and year, Q measures growth opportunities, P 
measures investor protection, and Z is a vector of controls based on HPS (2007).  Each 
specification includes as a control the blockholder share at the start of the year (BHSt-1), because 
firms with a high blockholder share are more likely to experience declines (in the limit, it is not 
possible for firms that have no blockholders to experience decreases in block ownership). We 
also include year fixed effects as well as the log of GDP per capita, in an effort to isolate the 
effects of investor protection as distinct from overall financial development. Standard errors are 
clustered by country. 
Table V shows the results.  The 0.029 coefficient on lagged Tobin’s Q in the first column 
implies that a one standard deviation increase in a firm’s investment opportunities from its mean, 
keeping all other variables at their mean, increases the likelihood of a large drop in the 
blockholding share by 2.1 percentage points.  The negative and significant coefficient on the Low 
Legal Protection dummy and the positive and significant coefficient on Stock Market Turnover 
are consistent with our earlier country-level findings.  Moving from a low to a high investor 
protection country increases the probability of a decrease in the blockholding share by 6.9 
percentage points. The regression in the first column of Table V is essentially the firm-level 
analogue of the regressions in Table IV, subjected to additional controls.   19 
 
We next estimate how ownership changes in response to investment opportunities, and 
how this sensitivity varies across countries.  We include in our regression the interaction of 
lagged Tobin’s Q with our investor protection dummy variable. The results appear in the second 
column. The interaction term is negative and significant. The 0.036 coefficient on lagged Tobin’s 
Q, together with the -0.042 coefficient on the interaction term, imply that decreases in 
blockholdings occur when growth opportunities are high, but only in countries with strong 
investor protection.  The differences between the first two columns suggest that the effects of 
being in a country with strong investor protection operate through differences in the way firms 
respond to growth opportunities.   
The next two columns vary the proxy for investor protection.  Here we use a dummy 
variable that is equal to one for countries in which the block premium as measured by Dyck and 
Zingales (2004) is above the median across countries in our sample.  The -0.221 coefficient on 
this variable in column 3 implies that moving from a country with a high block premium to a 
country with a low block premium increases the probability of a decrease in the block ownership 
share by about 7.6 percentage points.  Column 4 shows that when we include the interaction of 
the High Block Premium dummy variable with lagged Tobin’s Q, the coefficient is negative and 
significant. Thus, we get broadly similar results using this other measure of investor protection.  
In columns 5-8, we replace the firm specific measures of Tobin’s Q with an industry measure of 
Tobin’s Q.  The results are again similar.
10 
The results in Table V suggest that liquidity has an effect on ownership diffusion that is 
independent from the effects of shareholder protection.  In the first column, Stock Market 
Turnover attracts a coefficient of 0.172, implying that a one standard deviation increase in stock 
                                                      
10 Similar results obtain if one uses a broader sample of firms that includes IPOs since 1990 and relaxes the 
restriction that ownership be measured soon after IPO. 20 
 
market turnover is associated with a 3.2 percentage point increase in the probability of a drop in 
the blockholding share. The effects of many of the firm level controls included in Table V 
resemble those estimated in HPS (2007).  Results in both papers indicate that lower asset 
tangibility (as measured by the ratio of net PPE to assets) and lower levels of internally generated 
funds (as measured by the ratio of EBITDA to sales) are associated with a greater likelihood of 
firms becoming widely held.  According to both sets of estimates, leverage does not have robust 
effects on the probability of a decrease in ownership concentration.  Our coefficient estimates on 
R&D/Assets and the R&D Dummy variable have the opposite sign of those in HPS (2007), 
although only the coefficients on the R&D Dummy are significant.  HPS (2007) present mixed 
results on the effects of size, but the coefficients on lagged log assets are consistently negative in 
our results.  This may reflect that larger firms require larger dollar value changes in ownership to 
exceed the 5% decrease in block holding ownership shares used to define the dependent variable. 
The control variables serve two purposes. First, they help control for firm-level 
characteristics, apart from Q, that might affect blockholders’ willingness to sell shares and grow. 
Second, as discussed in subsection D below, newly public firms in different countries have 
different characteristics. In our data, at the time they go public, firms in countries with weak 
investor protection are larger, more profitable and less R&D intensive than firms in countries 
with strong investor protection.  By including these characteristics on the right-hand-side of the 
regression, we reduce concerns about the effects of these differences. 
What drives changes in the blockholding share? By definition, changes in the 
blockholding share occur because of changes in shares outstanding, or because of blockholding 
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Where BH denotes the split adjusted shares held by blockholders, and N denotes shares 
outstanding. The first term on the right hand side of equation (5) captures changes in the 
blockholding share coming from blockholder sales. The second term captures the change in the 
block ownership share coming from share issuance.
11  The second term is itself composed of two 
terms: the percentage change in N, and a scaling factor that accounts for the fact that the dilution 
is a linear function of initial blockholdings. For example, in the extreme case where initial 
blockholdings are zero, changes in shares outstanding are irrelevant for the block ownership 
share.   
Our hypotheses concerning ownership dilution suggest that decreases in ownership 
concentration that are a response to investment opportunities should involve new share issuance 
and not just blockholder sales to diffuse owners.  Agency considerations predict that firms 
should raise additional equity to finance growth opportunities in countries where investor 
protection is strong. With respect to block sales, the predictions are less clear: in countries with 
good investor protection, blockholders should be willing to sell more overall, but there is no 
obvious interaction with investment opportunities. Blockholder sales, by themselves, do not raise 
additional capital.   
  One straightforward way to study different kinds of decreases in blockholding shares is to 
sort incidents in which the blockholding share drops by 5 percent or more into two groups: those 
that are due to blockholder sales, and those that are due to share issuance.  We code a dummy 
variable equal to one if the decrease in blockholding share is greater 5 percent and if the second 
term on the right-hand-side of equation (5) is positive. Thus, this dummy captures incidents in 
which a decrease in the blockholding share is at least partially driven by new issuance. We also 
                                                      
11 Share issuance can be due to secondary offerings or stock-based M&A. See Kim (2008) for details on the 
incidence of each across countries. 22 
 
code a dummy variable equal to one if the decrease in blockholding share is greater than five 
percent and if the second term on the right-hand-side of equation (5) is zero or negative. This 
variable captures decreases in ownership concentration that are driven by blockholder sales 
without additional equity issuance. By definition, these two dummy variables add up to the 
dummy variable analyzed in Panel A of Figure 3 and Table V.  
  Panels B and C of Figure 3 illustrate the extent to which decreases in the blockholding 
share can be attributed to new issues or to block sales. We first sort firms into groups based on 
the level of investor protection in their country of domicile. Within each of these groups, we sort 
again based on Tobin’s Q at the start of the year. Panel B shows the percentage of incidents, 
within each of the four groups, in which the blockholding share falls in part due to share 
issuance. Panel C shows the percentage of incidents, within each of the four groups, in which the 
blockholding share falls due to blockholder sales. Note that the bars in each group in Panels B 
and C add to the height of the bars in Panel A.  
This decomposition affords several observations: First, decreases in ownership 
concentration that involve share issuance are more common than decreases that are solely due to 
block sales. This can be seen by comparing the levels of the bars in Panel B to the levels of the 
bars in Panel C.   Second, Panel B shows that firms with better growth opportunities are more 
likely to issue shares, and the effect of growth opportunities is larger in countries where investor 
protection is strong.  Third, Panel C shows that decreases in blockholding shares that are a 
consequence of blockholders selling to diffuse owners do not seem to be much affected by 
growth opportunities. 
More formal analysis is shown in Table VI.  We repeat the specification from Table V 
using different dependent variables; the table only shows the main coefficients of interest.  In 23 
 
Panel A, the dependent variable measures whether the blockholding share changes as a 
consequence of share issuance. In the first column, the coefficient on Tobin’s Q is positive and 
significant, and the coefficient on Low Legal Protection is negative and significant.  Thus, firms 
with better investment opportunities, and firms in countries with stronger investor protection, are 
more likely to experience decreases in the blockholding share as a consequence of new share 
issuance.  The specification in the second column adds Tobin’s Q interacted with Low Legal 
Protection.  The coefficient on this term is negative and significant, and the coefficient on Low 
Legal Protection on its own becomes insignificant.  Thus, in countries with strong investor 
protection, firms are more likely to become widely held because they are issuing equity to pursue 
growth opportunities.  Columns 2 and 3 repeat these tests using our alternative measure of 
investor protection, and columns 4-8 replace firm specific measures of Tobin’s Q with industry 
measures. Although the statistical significance is weaker in column 6, the basic effects remain. 
The dependent variable used in Panel B is a dummy that is equal to one if the decrease in 
block holding share is greater than 5% and driven by block sales alone. The negative coefficients 
on Low Legal Protection in columns 1 and 5 and High Block Premium in columns 3 and 7 
indicate that decreases in the block holding share that are a consequence of blockholders selling 
to diffuse owners are more common in countries with strong investor protection.  However, the 
results in even-numbered columns indicate that the coefficients on proxies for investor protection 
interacted with measures of growth opportunities are insignificant.   Thus, decreases in the 
blockholding share that are a consequence of blockholders selling their stakes are more common 
in countries with strong investor protection, but they do not reflect a response to growth 
opportunities. 24 
 
  Although they are not reported in the table, we turn briefly to the control variables, which 
provide some additional color. Stock Market Turnover influences issuance in all of the 
regressions in Panel A, but it does not come in significantly in Panel B. When looking only at 
incidents where blockholders sell without changes in shares outstanding we do not find any 
relation with past stock returns. The coefficient on leverage is positive and significant in the 
specifications in Panel A but not in Panel B.  This is consistent with the view that firms with high 
leverage lack access to additional debt and are likely to finance growth with newly issued equity 
instead. 
 
C.  Implications for financing choices and growth patterns 
  When faced with investment opportunities, firms in countries with weak investor 
protection are reluctant to issue new shares and dilute the control of blockholders.  Perhaps these 
firms rely more heavily on debt financing, allowing blockholders to maintain effective control, 
while still raising some capital. We consider this possibility here.  
  We keep the analysis as close in spirit to our baseline specifications. We define the 
dependent variable as a dummy equal to one if leverage, defined as the ratio of the book value of 
debt to assets, increases by more than five percentage points.
12  The regressions that follow use 
industry measures of Tobin’s Q to proxy for growth opportunities and therefore are similar to 
those in columns 5-8 of Table V.   
The results in columns 1 and 3 of Table VII show that increases in leverage are not 
significantly related to growth opportunities and furthermore appear unrelated to investor 
protection.  When interactions of proxies for weak investor protection and Tobin’s Q are 
included, however, as in columns 2 and 4, the coefficient on this interaction is positive and 
                                                      
12 Similar results obtain if one analyzes continuous measures of leverage increases in a Tobit specification. 25 
 
significant.  Thus, firms in countries with weak investor protection tend to increase leverage 
more than firms in countries with strong investor protection when growth opportunities are 
attractive.   
  A number of papers document a relation between financial development and country-, 
industry-, and firm-level growth.  Levine (2005) surveys this work. Even though we find firms in 
countries with weak shareholder protection substituting towards debt to finance growth 
opportunities, this substitution may be incomplete. That is, firms in these countries could raise 
less financing overall, and invest less.  While it is not our intention to reinvent the wheel in the 
extensive finance and growth literature, we can use our main specification from Table VII to 
understand the determinants of investment. Investment is measured as the change in net PPE 
scaled by average net PPE over the year.   
Tests explaining investment are shown in Table VIII.  Investment is higher for firms in 
industries with higher Tobin’s Q, and lower for firms in countries with poor investor protection.  
The negative coefficients on the interactions of measures of investor protection and Tobin’s Q in 
columns 2 and 4 imply that firms in countries with poor investor protection increase investment 
by less than firms in countries with strong investor protection in response to more attractive 
investment opportunities.  In untabulated regressions, we find nearly identical results for asset 
growth, a broader measure of total investment.  These results are reminiscent of Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Maksimovic (1998) and Rajan and Zingales (1998).  They indicate that the type of firms that 
are particularly likely to become widely held—those that face attractive growth opportunities and 
are in countries with strong investor protection—grow.   
 
D.  Alternative hypotheses explaining the diffusion of ownership 
 26 
 
We have focused so far on considering agency based explanations of the tradeoff 
between maintaining control and obtaining capital.  Other explanations could play a role in 
explaining the diffusion of ownership, and their effects could distort the findings in the previous 
subsections.  Here we consider four such alternatives.   
i)  Market Timing 
One alternative theory that may explain the dynamics of ownership more generally is 
market timing. Blockholders and managers might attempt to time the equity market when selling 
existing shares or when issuing new shares.  Consistent with this, our results in Table V confirm 
that decreases in the blockholding share are more likely following high stock returns.  The 0.070 
coefficient on lagged firm-level stock returns in the first column of Table V implies that a one 
standard deviation increase in this variable is associated with a 2.2 percentage point greater 
likelihood of a decrease in the blockholding share.  However, as indicated in the analysis used to 
create Table VI, past returns operate through decreases in blockholding shares involving new 
share issues, not sales by blockholders.  The coefficient on lagged firm returns is negative and 
insignificant in explaining decreases in the blockholding share that are a consequence of 
blockholder sales to diffuse owners.  This result casts doubt on market timing explanations, 
because blockholders stand to gain more from timing the sale of their own shares, compared to 
the gain from new issues (in which they benefit only if net issuance is very large relative to 
shares outstanding).  We also find that decreases in blockholding shares are not predictive of low 
future returns (not tabulated).
13  Taken together, our results suggest that decreases in 
blockholding shares take place when past returns and current valuations are high, but these 
                                                      
13 We have also conducted tests similar to those in columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 of Table V but included past returns and 
future returns over a one year horizon as well as these variables interacted with the measures of investor protection.  
None of these interaction terms is significant, and their inclusion does not have a substantive effect on the 
interaction of measures of Tobin’s Q with investor protection.  Therefore, market timing considerations do not 
appear to be particularly salient in countries with strong or weak investor protection.  27 
 
decreases do not predict that firm valuations in the marketplace will revert to lower levels.  In 
sum, market timing receives only limited support. 
ii)  Stock Market Liquidity 
Liquidity would have an effect on ownership concentration if insiders are more willing to 
sell shares when the price impact of doing so is smaller.  When applied to our data, the liquidity 
theory has a straightforward prediction: decreases in ownership concentration should be more 
common when the stock trades in a more liquid market. Consistent with this prediction, and 
consistent with HPS (2007), Table V shows that decreases in blockholding shares are more likely 
in countries with liquid markets.  We also replicate the results in Table V using a firm-level 
measure of turnover, getting similar results to HPS (2007). 
If market liquidity is correlated with investor protection, the coefficient on the interaction 
terms in Table V could indicate how ownership concentration responds differently to investment 
opportunities in countries with different levels of liquidity.  We address this possibility by 
including measures of Tobin’s Q interacted measures of liquidity in our main tests.  The 
coefficient on this interaction term is insignificant, and its inclusion does not have a material 
impact on the coefficients on the interactions of Tobin’s Q with measures of investor protection 
except for the coefficient on this interaction term in the test presented in column 6 of Table V 
which becomes slightly smaller in magnitude and insignificant.  Therefore, while liquidity 
appears to affect the diffusion of ownership, its effects seem independent from the effects of 
investor protection. 
iii)  Characteristics at IPO 
Third, the characteristics of firms going public may differ across countries, and these 
characteristics could affect estimates of the importance of institutions. The consequences of 28 
 
selling any shares to diffuse shareholders in countries with weak investor protection might make 
some firms less likely to go public in such environments.  To consider this possibility, Table IX 
presents mean firm characteristics for firms within a year of first listing, dividing the sample on 
the basis of the legal protection of investors.  The first column displays means for firms in 
countries with where the legal protection of investors is low, the second column for firms where 
it is high, and the third column gives the difference and shows whether the difference is 
statistically significant.   
Three firm characteristics appear to differ significantly across the two subsamples.  
Newly public firms in countries with low legal protection appear to have higher assets, higher 
ratios of EBITDA to sales, and to be less R&D intensive (in that they report lower ratios of R&D 
to assets and are more likely to report R&D expenditures).  Our regressions control for these 
characteristics, and the results in Table V suggest that larger, more profitable firms are less likely 
to experience decreases in blockholder shares.  Therefore, the characteristics of newly public 
firms in countries with weak investor protection do affect the diffusion of ownership, but the 
effects of size, profitability, R&D intensiveness and measures of investment opportunities 
operate independently from measures of investor protection and the interaction of measures of 
investor protection with measures of investment opportunities.   
iv)  Country Differences in Growth Opportunities 
Fourth and last, growth opportunities may have differed across countries during our 
sample period in a way that is correlated with investor protection.  The tests presented in Table V 
directly control for growth opportunities with measures of Tobin’s Q, and the results indicate 
that firms with higher Tobin’s Q are more likely to experience decreases in the share of 
ownership owned by blockholders.  Additional analysis indicates that measures of Tobin’s Q and 29 
 
investor protection pick up independent effects.  In specifications that include both of these, 
dropping either does not much change the coefficient on the other.  However, growth 
opportunities may be mismeasured and could conceivably be relatively better than they appear in 
countries with strong investor protection.  It is possible to see if our estimates of the effect of the 
interaction of investment opportunities with investor protection are robust to this concern by 
including country-year fixed effects in the specifications presented in Table V.  Tests including 
these effects indentify the impact of investor protection by comparing, across investor protection 
regimes, within country differences in the extent to which block ownership falls for firms with 
different relative levels of growth opportunities.  Country differences in growth opportunities are 
absorbed by the fixed effects.  In such specifications (not tabulated), the interaction coefficients 
are similar in magnitude and significance to those presented in Table V.  
  
III. Conclusions 
We study how the structure of corporate ownership of a firm evolves following first 
listing, and how this evolution varies across countries.  Ownership concentration of newly public 
firms is high and does not vary with the level of investor protection.  In countries with strong 
investor protection, firms are more likely to experience decreases in the share of ownership of 
blockholders. Why? In these countries, firms with attractive growth opportunities are more likely 
to issue equity, diluting their blockholders in the process. Blockholders are also unconditionally 
more likely to sell. As a result, firms in environments with poor investor protection grow less, 
and when they do use external finance to fund growth, they lean more heavily on debt.  
Alternative explanations for the diffusion of ownership receive some support, but they do not 
distort conclusions about the role of investor protection.  The results indicate important 30 
 
connections between ownership concentration and growth and suggest that a dynamic view of 
corporate ownership is required to fully account for the patterns in the data.  Our main 
observation is that firms become widely held in large part because they grow. 
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Figure 1. Tracing Out the Evolution of Ownership.
The evolution of shares outstanding, total blockholdings, and the blockholding share for three firms following their IPO. Total shares 
outstanding (thick lighter line) and total blockholdings (thin darker line) are plotted on the left vertical axis. The blockholding share (dashed 
line) is plotted on the right axis. On the left axis, both series are scaled by shares outstanding at the IPO.  Nihon Eslead (Panel A) is a real-
estate developer in Japan. Carrier Access (Panel B) manufactures telecommunications equipment. Infineon (Panel C) is a spinoff from 
German industrial conglomerate Siemens. 
Panel C: Infineon 2000-2006Figure 2. Blockholding Shares and Investor Protection.
Median blockholding share of firms in the IPO sample in years relative to their IPO date.  The dashed line indicates median values of 
blockholding ownership shares for firms in countries where the Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer  (2008) anti-self-dealing 






























IPO IPO+1 IPO+2 IPO+3 IPO+4 IPO+5 IPO+6Figure 3.  The Incidence of Decreases in Blockholding Shares
The incidence of decreases in blockholding shares that exceed 5% for firms in different countries that face different growth 
opportunities.  Panel A shows the incidence of all decreases; Panel B shows the incidence of decreases that involve new share 
issuance; and Panel C shows the incidence of decreases that are solely due to blockholder sales
Panel A: All decreases in blockholdings











Panel B: Decreases in blockholdings involving new share issuance










Panel C: Decreases in blockholdings resulting from  blockholder sales
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Low Legal Protection High Legal Protection
High Growth Low GrowthYear Countries Firm-years Number of IPOs
IPO Sample:      
Firm-years
1995 23 3,385 159 85
1996 23 3,739 140 215
1997 23 4,126 205 367
1998 34 6,343 303 569
1999 34 7,135 382 787
2000 34 7,626 459 1,136
2001 34 7,478 238 1,462
2002 34 7,389 177 1,629
2003 34 7,381 107 1,752
2004 34 7,652 208 1,866
2005 34 8,341 322 2,079
2006 34 7,820 0 2,140
Total 78,415 2,700 14,087
Table I
Sample Construction
This table provides information on all firms for which data on the blockholding share are available and 
which are identified in Worldscope, summarized by year. The table reports the number of countries 
represented, the number of firm-years, the number of IPOs, and the number of firm-years for the firms in 
the IPO sample. Because we require at least two consecutive observations of the blockholding share, the 




Median Blockholding Share (in 2005) 34 0.38 0.39 0.20 0.00 0.76
Median Blockholding Share (following IPO) 34 0.53 0.53 0.17 0.20 0.83
Anti-Self-Dealing Index 34 0.54 0.47 0.25 0.17 1.00
Block Premium 31 0.11 0.04 0.15 -0.04 0.65
Stock Market Turnover 34 0.74 0.63 0.59 0.10 3.15
Log of GDP per capita 34 9.53 9.95 1.02 6.37 10.60
Dependent Variables:
Blockholding Share 13,392 0.35 0.34 0.26 0.00 1.00
Decrease in Blockholding Share Dummy 12,248 0.33 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00
(BH/N*(ΔN/N))>0 12,217 0.19 0.00 0.40 0.00 1.00
(BH/N*(ΔN/N))≤0 12,217 0.13 0.00 0.34 0.00 1.00
Increase in Leverage Dummy 12,452 0.18 0.00 0.38 0.00 1.00
Change in Net PPE 12,627 0.10 0.06 0.37 -2.00 2.00
Controls and RHS Variables:
Firm-specific Tobin's Qt-1 14,087 2.22 1.46 2.07 0.08 9.90
Industry Qt-1 14,087 2.07 1.70 1.23 0.26 6.48
Lagged Firm Level Stock Returns 14,087 0.24 0.00 0.93 -0.99 31.94
Log Assetst-1 14,087 13.04 12.92 1.53 6.89 20.37
Net PPEt-1/Assetst-1 14,087 0.26 0.18 0.23 0.00 0.92
EBITDAt-1/Salest-1 14,087 -0.05 0.14 1.00 -6.09 0.92
R&Dt-1/Assetst-1 14,087 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.35
R&D Dummy 14,087 0.45 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
Debtt-1/Assetst-1 14,087 0.21 0.16 0.21 0.00 0.85
Panel A: Country characteristics
Panel A shows country characteristics. These include the median blockholding share computed in 2005; the median blockholding share computed 
within one year of the year the firm went public;  the anti-self-dealing index drawn from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 
(2008); Block Premium, which is the mean block premium measure drawn from Dyck and Zingales (2004); Stock Market Turnover, which 
measures the total value of stocks traded as a fraction of shares outstanding, is taken from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006); and log 
of per capita GDP expressed in US dollars. Panel B summarizes dependent variables as well as firm-year characteristics used in the firm-level 
regressions. The Blockholding Share is the percentage of the firm's equity controlled by blockholders; the Decrease in Blockholding Share 
Dummy takes a value of one if the blockholding share drops by five percent; (BH/N*(ΔN/N))>0 is a dummy equal to one when the drop in the 
blockholding share involves equity issuance; (BH/N*(ΔN/N))≤0 is a dummy equal to one when the drop in the blockholding share is due to block 
sales; the Increase in Leverage Dummy takes a value of one if leverage increases by more than five percent; Change in Net PPE is scaled by 
average PPE between last year and the current year; Tobin's Q is measured as the ratio of the sum of the market value of equity and the book value 
of debt to the book value of assets and is lagged and measured at the firm- or industry-year level; stock market returns are measured in local 
currency terms each year; Net PPE is a firm's net property plant and equipment.  EBITDA is a firm's earnings before interest, taxes, and 
depreciation; R&D refers to research and development expenditures, and the R&D dummy is equal to one for firms that report positive levels of 
R&D.  All scaled variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to remove the influence of outliers. 
Summary Statistics: Country and Firm Level Characteristics
Table II
Panel B: Firm CharacteristicsPanel A: In 2005, for firms that have been public for at least 5 years
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 1.584 1.582 1.562
(9.693)*** (9.291)*** (9.126)***




Log of GDP per Capita -0.132 -0.121 -0.124
(6.847)*** (6.305)*** (6.180)***
No. of Obs. 34 34 34
R-Squared 0.476 0.456 0.530
Panel B: Immediately following IPO
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 1.236 1.238 1.227
(6.832)*** (7.363)*** (6.570)***




Log of GDP per Capita -0.078 -0.072 -0.074
(3.742)*** (3.691)*** (3.373)***
No. of Obs. 34 34 34
R-Squared 0.237 0.223 0.256
Blockholding Share
Stock Market Turnover
Cross-sectional regressions that explain the country median blockholding share. In Panel A, the dependent variable 
is the median blockholding share computed in 2005 using data on firms that have been public for at least 5 years.   
In Panel B, the dependent variable is the median blockholding share computed within one year of first listing date.  
Low Legal Protection is a dummy equal to one if the Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) anti-
self-dealing index is below its sample median of 0.47.  Stock Market Turnover is the total value of stocks traded as 
a fraction of shares outstanding.  In Panel A, the Log of GDP per Capita is measured in 2005, and in Panel B the 
Log of GDP per Capita is the mean of the log of gdp per capita across IPO year observations for firms in the 
sample.  Heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics are shown in parentheses. (***, **,* denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels.)
Table III
Country Characteristics and Blockholdings
Blockholding Share
Stock Market TurnoverDependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3)
Constant -0.249 -0.239 -0.247
(3.778)*** (3.568)*** (3.703)***
Blockholding Sharet-1 0.196 0.163 0.174
(4.549)*** (4.745)*** (4.874)***






No. of Obs. 349 331 331
R-Squared 0.120 0.107 0.125
Log of GDP per Capita
Stock Market Turnover
Table IV
Country Characteristics and Blockholdings
The dependent variable is the median decrease in blockholdings, as a percentage of shares outstanding, in each 
country-year. Low Legal Protection is a dummy equal to one if the Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2008) anti-self-dealing index is below its sample median of 0.47.  Stock Market Turnover is the total 
value of stocks traded as a fraction of shares outstanding.  T-statistics based on standard errors that are clustered 
at the country-level and are shown in parentheses. (***, **,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels.) 
Decreases in Blockholding ShareDependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant -1.950 -2.233 -1.911 -1.985 -2.222 -2.253 -1.879 -1.982
(2.845)*** (3.490)*** (2.114)** (2.154)** (3.279)*** (3.300)*** (1.972)** (2.040)**
Blockholding Sharet-1 1.257 1.255 1.241 1.239 1.281 1.280 1.266 1.266
(8.328)*** (8.354)*** (7.896)*** (7.878)*** (8.502)*** (8.540)*** (8.076)*** (8.119)***
Tobin's Qt-1 0.029 0.036 0.029 0.034 0.077 0.089 0.079 0.091
(2.729)*** (3.974)*** (2.832)*** (3.684)*** (4.117)*** (6.433)*** (4.331)*** (6.845)***
Low Legal Protection -0.200 -0.114 -0.202 -0.095
(2.983)*** (1.285) (2.981)*** (0.995)
-0.042 -0.055
(2.325)** (2.005)**
High Block Premium -0.221 -0.129 -0.226 -0.057
(2.862)*** (1.295) (2.771)*** (0.529)
-0.046 -0.086
(2.619)*** (3.496)***
Stock Market Turnover 0.172 0.172 0.175 0.175 0.171 0.170 0.172 0.174
(3.645)*** (3.701)*** (3.474)*** (3.521)*** (3.640)*** (3.671)*** (3.408)*** (3.471)***
0.070 0.070 0.068 0.068 0.077 0.077 0.074 0.074
(5.697)*** (5.760)*** (5.575)*** (5.627)*** (6.322)*** (6.277)*** (5.984)*** (5.885)***
Log Assetst-1 -0.082 -0.082 -0.085 -0.086 -0.085 -0.086 -0.089 -0.089
(5.790)*** (5.845)*** (5.517)*** (5.572)*** (5.715)*** (5.725)*** (5.571)*** (5.596)***
Net PPEt-1/Assetst-1 -0.137 -0.138 -0.145 -0.145 -0.103 -0.103 -0.111 -0.109
(2.326)** (2.357)** (2.558)** (2.547)** (1.569) (1.595) (1.703)* (1.686)*
EBITDAt-1/Salest-1 -0.042 -0.041 -0.043 -0.042 -0.032 -0.031 -0.032 -0.032
(3.799)*** (3.655)*** (3.955)*** (3.832)*** (3.254)*** (3.144)*** (3.421)*** (3.358)***
0.021 0.016 0.001 -0.008 -0.064 -0.079 -0.082 -0.102
(0.090) (0.068) (0.004) (0.035) (0.258) (0.325) (0.344) (0.438)
0.098 0.094 0.097 0.095 0.079 0.075 0.078 0.074
(2.188)** (2.102)** (2.162)** (2.098)** (1.786)* (1.685)* (1.767)* (1.679)*
Debtt-1/Assetst-1 0.222 0.222 0.218 0.217 0.234 0.234 0.234 0.231
(1.383) (1.392) (1.376) (1.380) (1.513) (1.518) (1.516) (1.514)
0.187 0.190 0.188 0.195 0.184 0.186 0.178 0.187
(3.403)*** (3.406)*** (2.452)** (2.483)** (3.250)*** (3.236)*** (2.248)** (2.289)**
No. of Obs. 12,248 12,248 12,023 12,023 12,330 12,330 12,100 12,100
Log Likelihood -7,154 -7,151 -7,026 -7,023 -7,189 -7,187 -7,059 -7,055
R&D Dummyt-1
Log of GDP per Capita
Firm Specific Tobin's Q Industry Q
Low Legal Protection *       
Tobin's Qt-1
High Block Premium *       
Tobin's Qt-1
Lagged Firm Level Stock 
Returns
Table V
Growth Opportunities and Decreases in Blockholding Shares
Probit specifications explaining decreases in blockholding shares.  The dependent variable is a dummy that takes on a value of one when the 
blockholding share decreases by more than 5 percent.  Low Legal Protection is a dummy equal to one if the Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) anti-self-dealing index  is below its sample median.  High Block Premium is a dummy equal to one if the block 
premium, as measured in Dyck and Zingales (2004), exceeds its sample median.  In columns 1-4, Tobin's Q is measured as the ratio of the sum 
of the market value of equity and the book value of debt to the book value of assets, and in columns 5-8, it is measured by taking means of this 
ratio across all firms in the same industry and year.  Stock Market Turnover is the total value of stocks traded as a fraction of shares 
outstanding.  Lagged Firm Level Stock Returns are in local currency terms.  Net PPE is a firm's net property plant and equipment.  EBITDA is 
a firm's earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation.  R&D refers to research and development expenditures, and the R&D dummy is equal 
to one for firms that report positive levels of R&D.  Each specification includes year fixed effects.  Z-statistics based on standard errors that are 
clustered at the country-level are shown in parentheses. (***, **,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.) 
Decrease in Blockholding Share Dummy
R&Dt-1/Assetst-1Panel A: Share Issuance
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Blockholding Sharet-1 1.761 1.759 1.763 1.761 1.783 1.782 1.786 1.785
(9.874)*** (9.913)*** (9.850)*** (9.834)*** (9.565)*** (9.597)*** (9.542)*** (9.578)***
Tobin's Qt-1 0.025 0.033 0.024 0.029 0.081 0.092 0.083 0.094
(2.746)*** (5.617)*** (2.713)*** (4.134)*** (4.839)*** (7.548)*** (5.077)*** (8.337)***
Low Legal Protection -0.143 -0.032 -0.142 -0.043
(2.492)** (0.415) (2.431)** (0.496)
-0.052 -0.049
(3.096)*** (1.552)
High Block Premium -0.187 -0.078 -0.187 -0.017
(2.883)*** (0.928) (2.698)*** (0.194)
-0.052 -0.085
(3.326)*** (2.818)***
No. of Obs. 12,217 12,217 11,992 11,992 12,299 12,299 12,069 12,069
Log Likelihood -5,338 -5,334 -5,239 -5,236 -5,359 -5,357 -5,258 -5,255
Panel B: Block Sales
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Blockholding Sharet-1 0.017 0.018 -0.009 -0.009 0.028 0.028 0.003 0.003
(0.218) (0.221) (0.117) (0.115) (0.381) (0.375) (0.039) (0.037)
Tobin's Qt-1 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.015 0.019 0.015 0.018
(0.819) (0.621) (0.864) (0.815) (1.133) (1.396) (1.144) (1.351)
Low Legal Protection -0.126 -0.142 -0.130 -0.094
(2.150)** (1.725)* (2.243)** (1.090)
0.008 -0.019
(0.427) (0.853)
High Block Premium -0.115 -0.119 -0.123 -0.082
(1.780)* (1.380) (1.866)* (0.899)
0.002 -0.021
(0.102) (0.847)
No. of Obs. 12,217 12,217 11,992 11,992 12,299 12,299 12,069 12,069
Log Likelihood -4,693 -4,693 -4,602 -4,602 -4,724 -4,724 -4,634 -4,634
High Block Premium *      
Tobin's Qt-1
Probit specifications explaining decreases in blockholding shares that are the result of new share issuance and, alternatively, blockholder sales.  
In Panel A, the dependent variable is a dummy that takes on a value of one when the blockholding share decreases by more than 5 percent, and 
this decrease is partially a consequence of new share issuance. In Panel B, the dependent variable is  equal to one for decreases in bolckholdings 
that are entirely a consequence of blockholders selling shares. Low Legal Protection is equal to one if the Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
and Shleifer (2008) anti-self-dealing index is below its sample median.  High Block Premium is a dummy equal to one if the Dyck and Zingales 
(2004) block premium exceeds its sample median.  In columns 1-4 of each panel, Tobin's Q is measured as the ratio of the sum of the market 
value of equity and the book value of debt to the book value of assets, and in columns 5-8, it is the mean of this ratio across all firms in the same 
industry-year.  Stock Market Turnover is the total value of stocks traded as a fraction of shares outstanding.  Control variables include Stock 
Market Turnover, lagged stock returns, the log of lagged assets, the lagged net PPE to assets ratio, the lagged EBITDA to sales ratio, the lagged 
R&D to assets ratio, a lagged R&D dummy,  the lagged ratio of debt to assets, the log of GDP per capita, and a constant.  Lagged stock returns 
are in local currency and are measured at the firm level.  Net PPE is a firm's net property plant and equipment.  EBITDA is a firm's earnings 
before interest, taxes, and depreciation; R&D refers to research and development expenditures, and the R&D dummy is equal to one for firms 
that report positive levels of R&D.  Each specification includes year fixed effects.  Z-statistics based on standard errors that are clustered at the 
country-level are shown in parentheses. (***, **,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.) 
Table VI
 Share Issuance versus Block Sales
Low Legal Protection *      
Tobin's Qt-1
Decrease in Blockholding Share Dummy where (BH/N*(ΔN/N))≤0
Firm Specific Tobin's Q Industry Q
Decrease in Blockholding Share Dummy where (BH/N*(ΔN/N))>0
Firm Specific Tobin's Q Industry Q
Low Legal Protection *      
Tobin's Qt-1
High Block Premium *      
Tobin's Qt-1Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -0.261 -0.222 0.162 0.268
(0.473) (0.399) (0.325) (0.531)
Blockholding Sharet-1 -0.171 -0.170 -0.151 -0.150
(2.647)*** (2.584)*** (2.651)*** (2.606)***
Tobin's Qt-1 0.010 -0.006 0.009 -0.006
(1.005) (0.486) (0.966) (0.538)








Stock Market Turnover 0.097 0.099 0.091 0.090
(1.850)* (1.972)** (2.143)** (2.233)**
-0.027 -0.028 -0.028 -0.029
(1.039) (1.060) (1.070) (1.095)
Log Assetst-1 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003
(0.114) (0.056) (0.196) (0.155)
Net PPEt-1/Assetst-1 0.301 0.301 0.289 0.285
(2.814)*** (2.776)*** (2.620)*** (2.536)**
EBITDAt-1/Salest-1 -0.065 -0.066 -0.064 -0.065
(3.904)*** (4.036)*** (3.783)*** (3.826)***
-0.592 -0.565 -0.597 -0.562
(1.257) (1.233) (1.274) (1.238)
-0.181 -0.177 -0.174 -0.170
(4.943)*** (4.790)*** (4.537)*** (4.440)***
Debtt-1/Assetst-1 -0.114 -0.114 -0.112 -0.109
(1.161) (1.159) (1.121) (1.091)
-0.048 -0.050 -0.109 -0.117
(0.935) (0.970) (2.563)** (2.645)***
No. of Obs. 11,055 11,055 10,861 10,861
Log Likelihood -5,052 -5,048 -4,972 -4,967
Low Legal Protection *           
Tobin's Qt-1
Table VII
Growth Opportunities and Increases in Leverage
Increase in Leverage Dummy
Probit specifications explaining increases in leverage.  The dependent variable is a dummy that takes on a value of one when leverage, defined as 
the ratio of the book value of debt to the book value of assets, increases by more than 5 percent.  Low Legal Protection is a dummy equal to one 
if the Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) anti-self-dealing index is below its sample median.  High Block Premium is a 
dummy equal to one if the block premium, as measured in Dyck and Zingales (2004), exceeds its sample median.  Tobin's Q is measured as the 
ratio of the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt to the book value of assets, taking means of this ratio across all firms in 
the same industry and year.  Stock Market Turnover is the total value of stocks traded as a fraction of shares outstanding.  Lagged stock returns 
are in local currency terms and are measured at the firm-level.  Net PPE is a firm's net property plant and equipment.  EBITDA is a firm's 
earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation.  R&D refers to R&D expenditures, and the R&D dummy is equal to one for firms that report 
positive levels of R&D.  Each specification includes year fixed effects.  Z-statistics based on standard errors that are clustered at the country-
level are shown in parentheses. (***, **,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.)
High Block Premium *          
Tobin's Qt-1
Lagged Firm Level Stock Returns
R&Dt-1/Assetst-1
R&D Dummyt-1
Log of GDP per CapitaDependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.666 0.647 0.611 0.585
(6.076)*** (5.742)*** (5.700)*** (5.228)***
Blockholding Sharet-1 0.098 0.098 0.097 0.097
(3.050)*** (3.083)*** (2.860)*** (2.869)***
Tobin's Qt-1 0.035 0.042 0.034 0.037
(5.555)*** (12.107)*** (5.181)*** (6.621)***








Stock Market Turnover 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.033
(4.607)*** (4.043)*** (3.861)*** (3.722)***
0.039 0.039 0.040 0.040
(6.573)*** (6.517)*** (6.867)*** (6.819)***
Log Assetst-1 -0.019 -0.020 -0.019 -0.019
(2.981)*** (3.052)*** (2.875)*** (2.920)***
Net PPEt-1/Assetst-1 -0.105 -0.105 -0.102 -0.102
(4.280)*** (4.269)*** (3.967)*** (3.922)***
EBITDAt-1/Salest-1 0.028 0.028 0.027 0.028
(7.767)*** (7.712)*** (8.134)*** (8.150)***
-0.696 -0.704 -0.691 -0.696
(9.471)*** (9.806)*** (9.151)*** (9.330)***
-0.009 -0.011 -0.007 -0.008
(1.253) (1.592) (1.009) (1.122)
Debtt-1/Assetst-1 -0.095 -0.096 -0.097 -0.097
(2.682)** (2.718)** (2.710)** (2.746)**
-0.025 -0.024 -0.019 -0.017
(3.141)*** (2.903)*** (2.163)** (1.907)*
No. of Obs. 12,308 12,308 12,084 12,084
R-Squared 0.111 0.113 0.110 0.111
Low Legal Protection *       
Tobin's Qt-1
Table VIII
Growth Opportunities and Investment
Change in Net PPE
OLS specifications explaining net capital investment.  The dependent variable is the change in net PPE scaled by the average of beginning 
and end of period values.  Net PPE is a firm's net property plant and equipment.  Low Legal Protection is a dummy equal to one if the 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) anti-self-dealing index is below its sample median.  High Block Premium is a 
dummy equal to one if the mean block premium, as measured in Dyck and Zingales (2004), exceeds its sample median.  Tobin's Q is the 
ratio of the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt to the book value of assets, taking means of this ratio across all 
firms in the same industry and year.  Stock Market Turnover is the total value of stocks traded as a fraction of shares outstanding.  Lagged 
Firm Level Stock Returns are in local currency terms.  EBITDA is a firm's earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation.  R&D refers to 
R&D expenditures, and the R&D dummy is equal to one for firms that report positive levels of R&D.  Each specification includes year fixed 
effects.  T-statistics based on standard errors that are clustered at the country-level are shown in parentheses. (***, **,* denote significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.) 
High Block Premium *        
Tobin's Qt-1




Log of GDP per CapitaLow Legal Protection 
Countries
High Legal Protection 
Countries Difference
Tobin's Q 2.388 3.077 -0.688
(0.393)*
Log Assets 13.543 13.003 0.540
(0.156)***
Net PPE/Assets 0.330 0.242 0.088
(0.065)






Debt/Assets 0.212 0.204 0.008
(0.024)
Table IX
Differences in Firm Characteristics at Time of IPO
Mean values of firm characteristics within a year of first listing.  The table shows means for firms in countries 
with Low Legal Protection,  High Legal Protection, and the difference.  Low Legal Protection is a dummy 
equal to one if the Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) anti-self-dealing index is below 
its sample median.  Tobin's Q is the ratio of the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt 
to the book value of assets.  Net PPE is a firm's property plant and equipment.  EBITDA is a firm's earnings 
before interest, taxes, and depreciation.  R&D refers to R&D expenditures, and the R&D dummy is equal to 
one for firms that report positive levels of R&D.  T-statistics for test of the significance of the difference in 
means based on standard errors that are clustered at the country-level are shown in parentheses. (***, **,* 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.) 
R&D Dummy
R&D/Assets